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defendant is unable to pay his prosecution costs. Previous constitutional
attacks have depended upon nebulous interpretations of such far-reaching clauses as "due process" and "equal protection." These cases look
into and depend upon the administration of the statute in question and
therefore have often been limited in scope to particular fact situations
which arise under specific phraseology of the statute. But in Wright
v. Matthews,17 the thirteenth amendment is applied directly to the full
scope of such a statute, making it inherently unconstitutional. The
court declares that in Virginia the inability to pay prosecution costs
is not a crime, and that a person can be imprisoned only as punishment for a crime. Imprisonment for nonpayment of prosecution costs
is therefore unconstitutional. Defendants in Virginia, at least, can
now be assured that their economic status will no longer be a factor
in the determination of their period of incarceration.
HARRY SAUNDERS

Libel and Slander-PRIVILEGE-CIA COVERT AGENT'S STATEMENT
ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED. At three Estonian gatherings, defendant, National Commander of the Legion of Estonian Liberation, stated that
plaintiff was a Soviet agent or collaborator and should not receive the
Legion's cooperation during plaintiff's anti-communist film and lecture
tour of the United States." Plaintiff thereafter instituted a slander action,
alleging that defendant's statements were untrue, malicious, and defamatory. 2 Defendant asserted an absolute privilege, supported by affidavits executed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Deputy
Director These documents revealed CIA's covert employment of
17. 209 Va. 246, 163 S.E.2d 158 (1968).

1. Plaintiff, a Canadian citizen, active in Estonian groups, earned a portion of his
livelihood through exhibition of "Creators of Legend," a film portraying Communist
brutalities, and by lecturing on his personal experiences as a guerilla fighter and a
Russian prisoner. Heine v. Raus, 261 F. Supp. 570, 571 (D. Md. 1966). Defendant was
overtly employed as a highway research engineer for the Office of Research and
Development, Bureau of Public Roads, United States Department of Commerce. Id.
at 572.
2. Id. at 571.

3. Id. at 572-73. A defense of absolute privilege in slander actions is a complete
immunity from liability even where actual malice is alleged; a qualified privilege is
conditional immunity, and is defeated when actual malice is shown. "The decisions
have, indeed, always imposed as a limitation upon the immunity that the official's
act must have been within the scope of his powers." Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579,
581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950).
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defendant and instructions to defendant to warn Legion members that
plaintiff was a dispatched Soviet intelligence operative.'
The district court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, and concluded that a government employee who acted under
orders and had a duty to carry them out should be granted an absolute
privilege in a slander action. 5 The court found that the same considerations which underlie recognition of the privilege as to discretionary
acts at those levels of government where the concept of duty encompasses the exercise of discretionary authority were applicable in
the instant case.6
Recognizing this absolute privilege of the subordinate by attribution
of the superior, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated and remanded for a limited inquiry to identify the CIA official who, having
authority to do so, had issued, authorized, approved, or ratified the
7
instructions.
Absolute privilege as a defense by government employees below
cabinet rank" was recognized by the Supreme Court in Barr v. Matteo9
4. Heine v. Raus, 261 F. Supp. 570, 573.
5. Id. at 576.
6. Id.
7. Heine v. Raus, No. 11,195 (4th Cir. July 22, 1968).
8. The Supreme Court recognized an absolute privilege for cabinet officials in
Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498-99 (1896), reasoning that:
In exercising the functions of his office, the head of an Executive Dep artment, keeping within the limits of his authority, should not be under an
apprehension that the motives that control his official conduct may, at any
time, become the subject of inquiry in a civil suit for damages. It would
seriously cripple the proper and effective administration of public affairs
as entrusted to the executive branch of the government, if he were subjected to any such restraint. He may have legal authority to act, but he
may have such large discretion in the premises that it will not always be
his absolute duty to exercise the authority with which he is invested. But
if he acts, having authority, his conduct cannot be made the foundation of
a suit against him personally for damages, even if the circumstances show
that he is not disagreeably impressed by the fact that his action injuriously
affects the claims of particular individuals.
9. 360 U.S. 564 (1959), rehearing denied, 361 U.S. 855 (1959). The Court reasoned
that the privilege could not be restricted to executive officers of cabinet rank and noted
that it had never been so restricted by the lower federal courts, citing: Taylor v.
Glotfelty, 201 F.2d 51 (6th Cir. 1952) (psychiatrist in Medical Center for Federal
Prisoners); Smith v. O'Brien, 88 F.2d 769 (D.C. Cir. 1937) (Chairman of Tariff Commission); United States ex. rel. Parravicino v. Brunswick, 69 F.2d 383 (D.C. Cir. 1934)
(U.S. Consul); Farr v. Valentine, 38 App. D.C. 413 (1912); De Arnaud v. Ainsworth,
24 App. D.C. 167 (1904), error dismissed, 199 U.S. 616 (1905) (Chief of Record and
Pension Office, War Department); Carson v. Behlen, 136 F. Supp. 222 (D. R.I. 1955)
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in which the Acting Director of the Office of Rent Stabilization was
held absolutely privileged in issuing a press release containing defamatory material about agency employees. The Court reasoned that
"the same considerations which underlie the recognition of the privilege as to acts done in connection with a mandatory duty apply with
equal force to discretionary acts at those levels of government where
the concept of duty encompasses the sound exercise of discretionary
authority." 10 "It is not the title of his office but the duties ... which
must provide the guide in delineating the scope of the rule which
clothes the official acts of the executive officer with immunity from
civil defamation suits." 11
(chief of dietetic service in VA hospital); Tinkoff v. Campbell, 86 F. Supp. 331 (N.D.
INI. 1949) (collector of Internal Revenue); Miles v. McGrath, 4 F. Supp. 603 (D.Md.
1933) (Lieutenant Commander, Navy).
10. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 575. "That [defendant] was not required by law
or by direction of his superiors [to issue the press release] cannot be controlling." Id.
"The fact that the action here taken was within the outer perimeter of line of duty is
enough to render the privilege applicable.... .'Id.
11. Id. at 573-74. The Court relied heavily on Judge Learned Hand's opinion in
Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d. Cir. 1949), quoting:
It does indeed go without saying that an official, who is in fact guilty of
using his powers to vent his spleen upon others, or for any other personal
motive not connected with the public good, should not escape liability
for the injuries he may so cause; and, if it were possible in practice to confine such complaints to the guilty, it would be monstrous to deny recovery.
The justification for doing so is that it is impossible to know whether the
claim is well founded until the case has been tried, and that to submit all
officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of a trial and to
the inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but
the most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of
their duties. Again and again the public interest call for action which may
turn out to be founded on a mistake, in the face of which an official may
later find himself hard put to it to satisfy a jury of his good faith. There
must indeed be means of punishing public officers who have been truant to
their duties; but that is quite another matter from exposing such as have
been honestly mistaken to suit by anyone who has suffered from their
errors. As is so often the case, the answer must be found in a balance
between the evils inevitable in either alternative. In this instance it has been
thought in the end better to leave unredressed the Wrongs done by dishonest
officers than to subject those who try to do their duty to the constant
dread of retaliation . .

.

. and it can be argued that the official powers,

since they exist only for the public good, never cover occasions where the
public good is not their aim, and hence that to exercise a power dishonestly
is necessarily to overstep its bounds. A moment's reflection shows, however, that that cannot be the meaning of the limitation without defeating
the whole doctrine. What is meant by saying that the officer must be
acting within his power cannot be more than that the occasion must be
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The view that the defense as defined in Barr v. Matteo was not intended to be available to every government employee but perhaps was
to be limited to governmental officials whose duties encompass the
exercise of broad discretionary authority has generated considerable
nonjudicial commentary. 12 Without definitive discussion of this distinction, 13 lower federal courts since Barr v. Matteo have extended the
privilege to various levels of government employment, their relevant
inquiry directed at the scope of the actor's duty.1 4 Yet not all of these
such as would have justified the act, if he had been using his power for any
of the purposes on whose account it was vested in him.
12. See, e.g., Becht, The Absolute Privilege of the Executive in Defamation, 15
VAND. L. REv. 1127 (1962); Green, The Right to Conumunicate, 35 N.Y.U.-L. REv.
903 (1960); Handler & Klein, The Defense of Privilege in Defamation Suits Against
Government Executive Officials, 74 HARv. L. Rav. 44 (1960).
13. But see, Poss v. Lieberman, 299 F.2d 358, 360 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 944
(1962) (claims representative for the Social Security Administration), in which the
court questioned the validity of an absolute privilege defense: ". . . if applied to merely
clerical or minor administrative positions, important as it may be to positions on the
policymaking level." In Ove. Gustavsson Contracting Co. v. Floete, 299 F.2d 655, 659
(2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 827 (1963) (contracting officer of the General
Services Administration and his assistant), the court stated that it saw:
no reason to doubt that the reasons of policy... afford protection to officials
of less than exalted or even less than high rank in the hierarchy of officialdom, as it is not improbable such as these defendants might well feel the
pressure of possible lawsuits and personal liabilities quite as much as would
those officials who are more in the public eye.
Id. at 659.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Waterman stated that:
In these days of greatly expanded governmental commercial activity
and increased governmental payrolls, I question the wisdom of flatly
holding that the law grants immunity from personal tort liability to all
governmental employees performing official duties that can be represented
by the actors to be duties involving the exercise of judgment or discretion.
Id. at 660.
See also Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 587 (1959) (Brennan J., dissenting).
14. Scherer v. Brennan, 379 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied 389 U.S. 1021
(1967) (Treasury agents). Chavez v. Kelley, 364 F.2d 113 (10th Cir. 1966) (Bureau
of Narcotics agent); Chafin v. Pratt, 358 F.2d 349 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 US.
878 (1966); Holmes v. Eddy, 341 F.2d 477 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 892
(1965) (various echelons of government employees, including an investigator for the
Securities and Exchange Commission); Waymire v. Deneve, 333 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1964)
(Bureau of Customs agent); Norton v. McShane, 332 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 981 (1965) (deputy U.S. Marshall in an action for assault and battery);
Keiser v. Hartman, 339 F.2d 597 (3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (Department
of Agriculture employees); Wozencraft v. Captiva, 314 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1963) (immediate supervisor of a chief engineer on a Department of Interior, Fish and Wildlife
Service vessel); Ove. Gustavsson Contracting Co. v. Floete, 299 F.2d 655 (2d Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 374 U.S. 827 (1963) (contracting officer of the General Services Ad-
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cases can be characterized as having involved governmental officials
whose duties encompassed broad discretionary authority.' 5
The level of the employee protected was made an issue in the instant
case by plaintiff's argument that the privilege does not apply to employees who exercise no discretion. 16 Either unwilling to extend the
privilege below the duty-encompassing broad discretion level, or uncertain as to whether a "covert" agent could be considered a government employee as envisioned in Barr v. Matteo, the court of appeals
nevertheless recognized that the policy upon which the privilege is
based could never be served if the privilege was denied those who execute an official's orders.' 7 The court assumed, arguendo, that the actor
ministration and his assistant); Poss v. Lieberman, 299 F.2cd 358 (2d Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 370 U.S. 944 (1962) (claims representative of the Social Security Administration); Preble v. Johnson, 275 F.2d 275 (10th Cir. 1960) (Civil Service employees);
Gamage v. Peal, 217 F. Supp. 384 (N.D. Cal. 1962) (Air Force Medical officers and. a
contract psychiatrist); Inman v. Hirst, 213 F. Supp. 524 (D. Neb. 1962) (Assistant Base
Supply Officer); Gaines v. Wren, 185 F. Supp. 774 (N.D. Ga. 1960) (acting depot
industrial relations officer).
15. See, e.g., Waymire v. Deneve, 333 F.2d 149 (5th Ci. 1964); Wozencraft v.
Captiva, 314 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1963); Preble v. Johnson, 275 F.2d 275 (10th Cir. 1960).
16. Heine v. Raus, 261 F. Supp. 570, 575. The district court rejected this contention,
citing Waymire v. Deneve, 333 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1964), and a section from-Wigmore,
8 J. WIGMORE, EvmENcE § 2368 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961), asserting absolute exemption from liability of a subordinate or ministerial official-i.e., one who acts under
orders of a superior official-for harm done in obedience to an order lawful upon its
face. The court also relied upon Barr v. Matec 360 U.S. 564 which had founded the
privilege on policy designed to aid in the effective functioning of governmentfunctions no less important because of rank in the executive hierarchy.
17. Heine v. Raus, No. 11,195 at 9. "If the circumstances impose a compelling moral
obligation upon the superior to defend and indemnify the subordinate, immunization
of the superior alone from direct defamation actions would be a useless formalism."
It is interesting to note that Chief Judge Haynsworth, writer of the instant opinion,
had sat on the court which decided Becker v. Philco Corp., 372 F.2d 771 (4th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 979 (1967), in which defendant corporation under contract
with the Government analogized its position with that of an executive agency of the
Government and was extended the privilege for defamatory reports made to the United
States under the terms of the defense contract. Mr. Chief Justice Warren, in dissenting
from a denial of a writ of certiorari, characterized this extension of the privilege as
"unwarranted," and stated that the Barr v. Mateo 389 U.S. 564, grant of an absolute
privilege to government employees at the expense of the individual's right to be free
from defamation had extended earlier decisions of the Supreme Court to what he and
others considered the breaking point. 389 U.S. at 980. Since the extension of the
privilege in Becker had not been greeted in all circles with unbridled enthusiasm,
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals was confronted with evolving a rationale logically
closer to those earlier precedents if the privilege was to be conferred without criticism
upon a "covert' agent of an executive agency.
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in the instant case was the Director of CIA himself, and having analyzed that the Director would have been privileged had he uttered the
defamation, recognized the necessary corollary-absolute privilege of
the subordinate by attribution to the superior.1 8 The court concluded
that the absolute privilege would be available to the defendant where
he acted under orders issued by an official authorized to issue such
orders at his discretion, or if the giving of the orders was subsequently
ratified and approved by such official.19
This inquiry into the authority of the official who issues or ratifies
and approves orders to employees asserting the absolute privilege demands closer scrutiny of an employee's scope of duty than heretofore
made, and formulates not only a necessary but also a reasonable rule
for availability of the defense if Barr v. Matteo extended the privilege
only to higher governmental officials. There would be little purpose to
a cloak of immunity for such officials if actions could be maintained
against employees who acted under orders from them and had a duty to
carry them out. While bringing a "covert" agent within the protection
afforded government employees may be questioned, it should be done
with less objection than that which accompanied the extension of like
immunity to a private corporation contracting with the government.20
18. Heine v. Raus, No. 11,195 at 9. The court found support in REsTATEmr (SEcoND)
"An agent is privileged to do what otherwise would constitute a tort if his principal is privileged to have an agent do it and has authorized the
agent to do it."
This rule had been suggested in Note, Developments in the Law-Remedies Against
the United States and Its Officials, 70 Harv. L. REv. 827, 836 (1957):
The immunity afforded the officer who makes a decision might not be
sufficient to permit efficient governmental operation if subordinates were
not also free from personal liability for performance of acts ordered by an
officer exercising his discretion. Accordingly, the proper performance of
functions which do not involve judgment and which are performed pursuant to orders of a superior who would not himself be liable for giving
the orders will not subject the subordinate to liability.
19. Heine v. Raus, No. 11,195 at 10. In remanding for a limited inquiry to identify
the CIA official who issued, authorized, approved, or ratified the instructions to defendant, the court desired to foreclose the permissible inference that the instructions
had been given by an unauthorized official and that his acts had never been approved
by an official having authority to issue or approve such instructions. This inference
remained even though the affidavits submitted by the CIA Deputy Director stated that
the defendant had acted under CIA orders, implying that the orders had been given
by or with the approval of an authorized official, and even though the Deputy Director's appearance in the case implied his personal approval and ratification.
20. Becker v. Philco Corp., 389 U.S. 979, 980 (1967) (Warren, CJ., dissenting),
discussed in note 17, supra.
or AGENCY § 345 (1958):
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Since the employee must bear the risk that the official issuing the
instructions does not have the proper authority, no government employee implementing orders can tell with certainty whether or not he
will receive absolute immunity for his acts. Such uncertainty was noted
by Mr. Chief Justice Warren in the standard formulated in Barr v.
Matteo.2" Still unanswered under this formula is at what echelon of
governmental duty the privilege inures.
Perhaps this recognition of the privilege for the subordinate, the uncertainty among scholars as to the reach of the absolute privilege, and!
the deliberate choice by the CIA of defamation as an instrument of
national policy 2 will lead to a reexamination by the Supreme Court
-of the language as well as the rationale of Bavr v. Matteo.
DON SCEARcr,

Negligence-DuTY

OF CARE-INVITEE-LICENSEE-TRESPASSER:
DisPlaintiff, a social guest, sustained injuries when
a knob of a faucet in defendant's bathroom broke while he was using it.
Action was brought and summary judgment for the defendant was
entered on the grounds that plaintiff, a licensee, took the premises
as he found them and the only duty owed by the defendant was to refrain from wantonly injuring his guest. The Supreme Court of California,' two justices dissenting, reversed, holding that under section
1714 of the civil code a landowner is liable for all injuries occasioned
by lack of ordinary care regardless of the status of the visitor.2
Liability of a landowner generally has been expressed in terms of
classifying the visitor either as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee.8 At
common law, a trespasser is one who has no right whatsoever to be
on the property,4 and the landowner is under no duty except to refrain

rINCTION

ABOLISHED.

21. 360 U.S. 564, 578 (1959).
22. See the dissenting opinion of Judge Craven in Heine v. Raus, No. 11,195 at 14.
1. Rowland v. Christian, - Cal.2d -, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (Cal. Sup. Cr..
1968).
2. § 1714 of the CAL_ CnL CODE provides:
Every one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also
for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill
in the management of his property or person, except so far as the latter has,
willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself ....
3. See cases cited under 65 CJ.S. Negligence § 63(1) (1966); Brush v. Public Serv-.
Co. of Ind., 106 Ind. App. 554, 21 N.E.2d 83 (1939); Williams v. Morristown Memorial
Hosp., 59 NJ. Super. 384 (1960).
4. RESTATEmENT (SEcOND)

OF TORTS § 329 (1965):

"A trespasser is a person who

